Although the European Union’s enlargement policy has gained new momentum and clearer contours over the past year, it appears that Serbia has fallen behind some countries in the region in this process, as indicated by messages from EU leaders who have repeatedly stressed that reforms must be implemented in full.
While Montenegro and Albania are recording visible progress and receiving increasingly clear signals from Brussels, Serbia is facing challenges.
On the key trends in enlargement policy, the role of geopolitics, the costs of enlargement and the steps Serbia must urgently take, Strahinja Subotić, Programme Director of the Centre for European Policy, spoke to EUpravo Zato.
An intensive year for EU enlargement policy
The past year was one of the most intensive when it comes to enlargement policy, marked by strong institutional and political engagement by the EU, our interlocutor assessed. As he notes, all key institutions, including the European Commission and the European Parliament, have sent a clear message that enlargement is one of the main priorities of the Union’s new political cycle. He particularly highlights the progress of Montenegro, but also Albania, which, as he says, “almost overnight managed to open a large number of negotiating clusters”, thereby sending a strong signal to the entire Western Balkans that reform efforts pay off.
“This has been a very intensive year for enlargement policy, given that it has been marked by significant progress, both by Montenegro, but what may be an even bigger surprise is Albania. Montenegro, as we know, is in the process of closing chapters, while Albania has almost managed to open all chapters overnight, which was a bold message to other Western Balkan countries, that is, to their citizens,” Subotić assesses.
Furthermore, there has been much discussion about the new Growth Plan, and countries have started to receive funds.
“Serbia received 7 per cent of the total amount allocated for pre-financing. Some other countries received the remainder of the unpaid funds based on the level of reforms implemented, and finally, the year was diplomatically very intensive. Among the actors were Marta Kos, António Costa and Ursula von der Leyen. All institutions, including the European Parliament, were engaged in enlargement, which in fact confirms the message that this is indeed one of the key priorities of this new set-up in the European Union,” he added.
Cluster 3 and why the reforms were not implemented
Speaking about Serbia’s delay in opening Cluster 3, Subotić stresses that the problem does not lie in unclear messages from Brussels, but in obligations that Serbia set for itself and failed to fulfil. According to him, Serbia had a clearly defined deadline, the end of 2025, by which it was supposed to implement key reforms in the area of the rule of law, but this did not happen.
“I would say that Serbia set itself a deadline for Cluster 3, and that was the fulfilment of various reforms by the end of 2025. By the end of 2025, those reforms were not implemented and Cluster 3 was not opened. That is the essence. The normalisation of relations with Pristina was a soft requirement and the ball was on the Pristina side of the court, and of course no one would have blocked us when it comes to opening Cluster 3 if all the reforms had been planned and implemented. So the deadlines were self-imposed, and we failed to meet some of the targets. We also did not fulfil any of the key reforms that were part of the new Growth Plan, and in the end this was confirmed by the government itself, because if you look at it, it was indicated that around 50 per cent of all planned activities in the National Programme for the Adoption of the EU Acquis were completed,” Subotić told our portal.
He added that he believes there is an awareness of this, and that he is certain most citizens think Serbia will never become a member, which explains the apathy. This, he assesses, should serve as a reminder to Belgrade that if this is a strategic goal, a new page must be turned.
“I think the Union is sending the best possible message and is in fact encouraging reforms, just as it shows that those who are working on reforms in Montenegro and Albania have a credible membership perspective,” he explained.
Foreign policy as a key condition for membership
One of the central problems in Serbia’s European integration, according to Subotić’s analysis, is the lack of alignment of its foreign policy with the EU, particularly in the context of relations with Russia.
He recalls that the EU, under strong geopolitical pressures, can no longer make concessions in this area and that the common foreign and security policy has become one of the key pillars of enlargement.
“Even if Serbia meets all democratic standards and normalises relations with Pristina, without alignment of its foreign policy with the EU, membership is not possible. During this year, the level of alignment with foreign policy has increased, but that does not change the essence, given that the declarations with which alignment was achieved do not concern Russia,” Subotić warns, recalling that Serbia committed itself to gradual alignment with the common foreign policy in order to advance as a future member.
Serbia’s stagnation, the interlocutor believes, sends a clear message to the rest of the region that enlargement is real for those who implement reforms. Montenegro is currently closest to membership, while Albania, if it maintains its pace, could soon join it.
Subotić notes that an Act of Accession for Montenegro is even being prepared, which, as he says, represents the clearest possible signal that the enlargement policy is not dead.
“Where Montenegro is today, Serbia could have been. The question is why it is not,” he observes.
The unavoidable topic of the war in Ukraine, along with global security instability, has further solidified the EU’s position that enlargement must also have a security dimension. In that context, any delay in aligning Serbia’s foreign policy with the Union further deepens distrust.
Subotić warns that the EU is increasingly insisting on solidarity, both among Member States and with candidate countries, and that Serbia risks further marginalisation if it does not react in time.
Which country in the region could be the next EU Member State?
Among the countries in the region, Montenegro is in the best position and could be the next to join, Subotić believes.
“Currently, the situation on the table is as follows: first is Montenegro, then Albania, followed by Ukraine, Moldova and then Serbia. Why do I say that? We used to be second, then third, now we are fifth, and we see that with the new concept of so-called front-loading, three clusters for Albania and Moldova have been technically opened. Cyprus, as the presiding country of the Council over the next six months, Sicily, Montenegro and the other three. In that sense, they have already overtaken Serbia in terms of the number of opened chapters, which is why we increasingly see Marta Kos, her cabinet and the Directorate-General placing these four countries in the foreground. Of course, Albania, as well as Ukraine and Moldova, are such complicated cases that Montenegro and Albania still have the greatest chances,” Subotić said, adding that nothing is guaranteed, especially bearing in mind that for each enlargement it is necessary to secure three fifths in the French parliament, that is, a referendum will be required.
“I think this is a major task for everyone and that this year will be extremely dynamic for us, historic for the future, from the historical perspective of the future of the entire continent,” he added.
What Serbia must do to regain credibility
If he had to single out one key step, Subotić says it is political responsibility and being present where decisions are made.
He assesses that failing to respond to invitations from the highest European officials further reinforces the views of those Member States that doubt Serbia’s European commitment.
“The next chance to truly turn the situation around is, I hope, in the next six months. That is crucial. We must not allow ourselves not to attend the summit in Montenegro. It would be a major mistake to appear there only formally, not for the sake of mere presence, but to appear with concrete results, to achieve all planned reform steps, both within the reform agenda adopted under the new Growth Plan, and to implement all substantive steps that Serbia has still committed to through the non-paper from the end of 2024. There will, of course, be a lot of rhetoric, but it will be important to show that Serbia is genuinely moving towards membership and that it will not allow itself to miss this opportunity. The next six months are decisive. If we continue as we have so far, I fear we will end up in a situation where the fears of a certain number of Member States will become so deeply entrenched that Serbia is not a credible partner, that I do not see how we will be able to get out of that situation,” Subotić concluded.
(EUpravo zato)
