Although it is a small Central European state, Hungary has recently been the focus of global attention. It is likely to remain so, as many are eagerly awaiting to see whether and how the new leader, Peter Magyar, will manage to dismantle the system of a captured state that Viktor Orbán spent 16 years building.
According to the latest results, Peter Magyar will enjoy a strong mandate - almost unimaginable in other European countries - with more than a two-thirds majority (71 per cent) secured by his party, Tisza. A record turnout of nearly 80 per cent further confirms that these elections were perceived as a crucial moment for political change.
Below is a closer look at how Magyar reached the point of launching a new phase in Hungarian politics.
Economic discontent and institutional erosion as root causes
The reasons for such a pronounced political shift primarily lie in domestic factors. According to public opinion surveys conducted just before the election, the key concerns for citizens were inflation and the rising cost of living (48.6 per cent), the perception of widespread corruption (42 per cent), and concerns about the state of democracy and the rule of law (35.9 per cent). Only afterwards do issues such as healthcare (31.5 per cent) and relations with the EU (29.1 per cent) come into focus.
Interestingly, migration and the war in Ukraine - issues heavily emphasised by Orbán during the campaign - ranked only sixth (23.2 per cent) and ninth (13.9 per cent) respectively among voters' priorities. Magyar's victory thus reflected his better understanding of citizens' needs compared to the incumbent prime minister.
This prioritisation stems from the fact that Hungary faces challenges such as prolonged stagnation, declining competitiveness, and eroded trust in institutions. This "chronic crisis" of governance has been further exacerbated by the perception of privileged treatment for politically connected economic actors, as well as by limited capacity to address such issues due to the prior weakening of institutions and the media.
Moreover, although Orbán took pride in his model of "illiberal democracy", it has now failed the test. That very model also led the EU to freeze billions in funds that would otherwise have been available to Hungary, primarily in the form of grants and favourable loans.
It is therefore unsurprising that one of Magyar’s key campaign promises was precisely to unlock those funds, seen as a prerequisite for the country’s economic recovery.
Instead of institutions: walking as a method of winning votes
It should be noted that neither the economic situation nor democratic standards were significantly better during the previous elections in 2022. Under similar circumstances, Orbán secured a two-thirds majority. The key difference lies in the approach - one that the opposition lacked at the time but which Magyar adopted in this election.
When he emerged on the political scene in 2024, Magyar presented himself as a relatively unknown mid-level bureaucrat, albeit one with significant insider knowledge of how the system functions. As a long-standing member of Orbán’s Fidesz party, he was intimately familiar with both party and state mechanisms, enabling him to identify key points of political attack with precision. Unlike earlier attempts by Orbán’s opponents, Tisza managed to overcome the traditional weaknesses of the opposition.
What particularly set Magyar apart was that, as he himself put it, he spent more time on the streets of Hungarian towns and villages than in his own flat. In other words, although he lacked access to public broadcasting and other institutional channels for addressing citizens, nothing prevented him from touring the country and engaging directly. On one occasion, as part of his campaign, he even walked 300 kilometres, reaching as far as Romania.
At the same time, his message was clear - he did not offer a shift to the left or right, but rather a system free of corruption. The results showed that this message resonated strongly with voters. Especially significant was the mobilisation through local initiatives and activist networks. A vast number of activists across Hungary enabled Magyar to run an omnipresent campaign and to deploy observers at polling stations.
The foreign policy dimension: between East and West
Although domestic issues dominated the electoral agenda, the country's foreign policy orientation also played an important role in shaping voter behaviour. To some extent, the election was perceived as a referendum on Hungary’s geopolitical positioning between East and West.
The previous policy of close relations with Russia, as well as a confrontational approach towards EU institutions, generated growing dissatisfaction among citizens - particularly given the limited tangible benefits of such a course. The fact that crowds chanted "Russians, go home" both before and after the election reflects broader discontent with the country’s foreign policy direction, especially since Orbán's government never adequately explained what Hungary had gained from its close ties with Moscow.
Revelations in the final weeks of the campaign, including alleged phone conversations between Hungary’s foreign minister and his Russian counterpart discussing confidential EU documents, further deepened public dissatisfaction. In this context, Tisza managed to position itself as a credible alternative advocating more stable and predictable relations with the EU.
Implications for the European Union: between expectations and constraints
Tisza's victory opens space for redefining relations between Hungary and the EU. Brussels will primarily expect swift and concrete steps towards restoring the rule of law and strengthening independent institutions - preconditions for unlocking substantial financial resources currently frozen.
The new political mandate also brings pressure for Hungary to engage more constructively in common EU policies, particularly in supporting Ukraine and aligning with the Union’s foreign policy positions. Additionally, the issue of abandoning the "veto policy", which previously hindered EU decision-making, is likely to arise - potentially allowing Hungary to move from being seen as a "problematic actor" to a more constructive partner.
Finally, as one of the few EU member states that has not adopted the euro, Hungary is expected to move towards joining the eurozone, thereby contributing to deeper integration within the Union.
Despite a more positive stance towards the EU, certain elements of Hungary’s previous policies are likely to remain unchanged. According to Magyar, the country will continue to pursue a restrictive migration policy. In his view, a migrant redistribution quota system is not acceptable, making this an area where he will diverge least from his predecessor.
As for Russia, although the rhetoric is expected to change, Magyar will likely seek transitional periods to achieve planned energy diversification. Furthermore, while he is expected to support EU enlargement towards the Western Balkans, Ukraine represents a specific case.
This is why Magyar has called - much to Brussels’ discontent - for a referendum should Kyiv approach EU membership. Therefore, while Hungary’s new political landscape opens the door to closer cooperation with European partners, it also highlights the complexity of the country’s political transformation after a prolonged period of centralised power.