The Student List Wins, Europe Congratulates: What Comes Next?

The evening and day following the decisive electoral victory of the Student List were marked by congratulations coming from senior officials of the European Union and its member states.

All of this confirms that a window of opportunity will now open for the new Government of the Republic of Serbia in its relations with the European Union. However, from the very first day of its formation, the Government will also face a series of inherited challenges that will require a response.

A window of opportunity: Acceleration of negotiations, financial assistance, and sectoral integration into the EU market

Opening of Cluster 3 and the expediting accession negotiations 

Although the European Commission has assessed since 2021 that Serbia meets the technical prerequisites - namely the benchmarks for opening the as-yet unopened chapters within Cluster 3 (Competitiveness and Inclusive Growth) - EU member states have so far been unable to reach a consensus on opening this negotiating cluster with Serbia. Arguments among member states varied, with some being entirely geopolitical in nature. Despite this, as a sign of goodwill and an extended hand to the new authorities in Belgrade, this cluster could reasonably be expected to open shortly after the formation of the Government. Given that Serbia is objectively already at a high level of technical readiness when it comes to meeting the benchmarks for opening chapters in Cluster 2, that cluster could also be opened within a relatively short period.

Disbursement of funds from the reform and growth facility

Although Serbia submitted a total of four requests for the release of funds from this Facility, a response from the European Commission was received for only the first request, while the response to the second request has been pending for over 15 and a half months, despite the prescribed 90-day deadline. This de facto freezing of disbursements to Serbia - presumably a consequence of failing to meet the criteria regarding the rule of law and the functioning of democratic institutions - could very likely be unblocked. In the short term, Serbia could count on a maximum of €310 million in financial aid for reform steps it has already submitted as completed, or, in the long term, the entire planned allocation of €1.58 billion, provided all necessary reforms are implemented. To make this possible, and following significant delays in the preceding period, the new Government would be expected to send an unambiguous signal to ministries and public administration as soon as possible that these reforms are a priority.

Additional sectoral integration into the EU single market

Three years after the publication of the New Growth Plan for the Western Balkans, with the exception of admission to the Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA), Serbia has not made major strides in this process.

As the opening of new early integration opportunities for candidate states was announced as part of the upcoming EU Enlargement Package, the new Government could take advantage of this to further integrate into the EU single market. This primarily relates to joining the EU Roam Like at Home area, as well as the long-awaited conclusion of the Agreement on Conformity Assessment and Acceptance of Industrial Products (ACAA) with the EU.

In the long run, alongside the regulatory alignment of its legislation with EU rules, Serbia could also look forward to even deeper integration into European supply chains.

Challenges in relations with the EU: From the urgent issue of Serbian drivers to the "eternal" Kosovo problem

Unresolved mobility issues for professional drivers from Serbia under the Schengen 90/180-day rule

Due to the digitalised monitoring of individuals' stays within the Schengen Area via the Entry/Exit System (EES) and the formal treatment of lorry drivers in the same manner as all other travellers, the transport sector - which forms the backbone of the Serbian economy - faces serious difficulties. As almost 90 per cent of goods from Serbia are transported by road, the transport sector's inability to serve the real economy could severely disrupt Serbia's role as a link in European supply chains, slow down exports, deepen the trade deficit, and consequently negatively impact overall economic activity, investment, employment, and macroeconomic stability. The new Government will have to address this challenge from day one, attempting to capitalise on the momentum of its victory to secure visas for domestic drivers from European states and, in the longer term, convince the EU of the need to adapt its rules to the specificities of the transport sector.

Demand for alignment with the EU Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and stance towards the Russian Federation

The enthusiasm surrounding the change of government and the congratulations from the EU could be replaced within just a few months by open calls for a clear foreign policy alignment, primarily regarding the Russian Federation. Although initial incentives - such as opening Cluster 3, signing the roaming agreement, and disbursing funds from the Reform and Growth Facility - might be offered to the new Government in "advance", it will undoubtedly be expected to align its foreign policy with that of the EU over time.

This challenge could potentially be avoided only if a peace agreement is reached in Ukraine, which currently appears unlikely. If that does not happen, and the new Government remains resolute in its refusal to impose sanctions on Russia, it is highly likely that member states that place particular emphasis on this (such as the Baltic republics and Poland) would block Serbia's further progress on its European path.

Unresolved status of Kosovo and Metohija

This issue has been, and will remain, by far the single greatest challenge for the incoming and any future Government of Serbia. Without a shadow of a doubt, the Government will be expected to continue the EU-facilitated dialogue with Priština and, ultimately, reach an agreement on so-called comprehensive normalisation. From the previous administration, many political agreements (so-called "accords") remain as a legacy to the new Government, which the EU will expect to see implemented regardless of their legal nature. In political terms, a degree of manoeuvring room exists, stemming from the fact that the other side in the Dialogue has failed to implement its key obligation to establish the Association of Serb-Majority Municipalities, which could be set as a prerequisite for resuming talks on other matters.

However, as the initial momentum following the student victory loses its immediacy, any further progress in accession negotiations, as well as disbursements from the Reform and Growth Facility, could become contingent upon further normalisation of relations with Priština.

Conclusion: Is sustainable progress on the European path possible?

The decisive victory of the Student List could provide the new Government with the political capital required to break the stalemate in relations with the EU and launch a new cycle of European integration. However, the expected opening of negotiating clusters, the unblocking of financial aid, and progress in sectoral integration would represent merely the beginning, not a guarantee of long-term progress towards EU membership.

The sustainability of this initial momentum will depend on the Government’s willingness not only to implement the necessary reforms, but also to make many difficult and publicly unpopular political decisions. The new Government will face challenges inherited from the recent and distant past, but the democratic legitimacy with which it assumes power is a vital tool in defending Serbia's national interests, which should serve as the guiding star of its foreign policy. Whether there will be understanding for them within the EU remains to be seen.