"Cluster" is a term that has become domesticated in the Serbian language in the context of European integration, representing the thematic grouping of individual chapters. Introduced in 2020 as part of the revised enlargement methodology, this almost-forgotten term gained popularity in the second half of 2024 when discussions about the potential opening of Cluster 3 (Competitiveness and Inclusive Growth) became more frequent.
After three years of stagnation, since the opening of Cluster 4 (Green Agenda and Sustainable Connectivity) at the end of 2021, Cluster 3 has returned to political and media discourse. Following arduous negotiations, EU member state ambassadors adopted conclusions on enlargement, acknowledging the European Commission’s assessment that Serbia is ready for Cluster 3.
However, it was added that the issue of opening the cluster would depend on further progress in negotiations, particularly in the areas of the rule of law and normalisation of relations with Pristina. This indicates that Cluster 3 has not yet been opened, but space is being created for it. Accordingly, we will outline how we arrived at this situation and what needs to be done for Cluster 3 to be opened in 2025.
How Did We Get Here?
1. It All Starts with the Commission
The European Commission is the engine of enlargement. Acting as the "good cop," Ursula von der Leyen has repeatedly stated that Serbia has been ready for the opening of Cluster 3 for several years. While facing criticism for being "too" positively inclined toward Serbia, considering the many unresolved issues, she insisted on the need to encourage Serbia, alongside other candidates, to implement reforms.
Notably, the Commission has continued this rhetoric under its new mandate. The new Commissioner for Enlargement, Marta Kos, has echoed her predecessor Oliver Várhelyi in stating that Serbia deserves to be rewarded. Finally, Gert Jan Koopman, head of the Directorate-General for Enlargement, highlighted the technical and substantive steps Serbia has taken. He sent signals of optimism, despite reservations from some member states, that progress could be achieved. Without such strong insistence by the Commission, Cluster 3 would likely not be as widely discussed today.
2. The Outgoing Hungarian Presidency
While the Commission initiates the process, the final decisions rest with the EU Council, where all 27 member states must agree, even on technical matters like opening clusters. If any other country but Hungary had held the Council presidency, it is unlikely that the push for opening Cluster 3 with Serbia would have remained so high on the agenda.
Hungary has made no secret that enlargement is one of its top priorities and that it would work to ensure Serbia, like other candidate countries, makes progress on its EU path. Hungary took the unusual step of presenting what might otherwise be considered a technical move – approving the letter inviting Serbia to submit its negotiating positions for Chapter 16 (Taxation) and Chapter 19 (Social Policy and Employment) – as a significant political milestone in the negotiations. These are the only two chapters within Cluster 3, out of a total of eight, for which Serbia has yet to submit positions.
Under normal circumstances, such news would not have been particularly noteworthy. However, given Serbia’s current position, this move aims to encourage decision-makers and demonstrate that opening Cluster 3 is possible.
3. The Incoming Polish Presidency
While Hungary’s prioritisation of Serbia is undeniable, over-prioritisation can sometimes have a counterproductive effect. Hungary, often seen within the EU as a "black sheep," has not always found allies eager to meet its demands.
In contrast, Poland, as the emerging superpower of Central Europe, is seen as more credible. As a country that emphasises the need for enlargement to both the East and Southeast of Europe, Poland has more leverage than Hungary. For several months, clear signals suggested that this issue would ultimately fall under Poland’s presidency. Hungary paved the way, but the official opening of Cluster 3 has been left to Poland’s mandate, potentially. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk’s public support for Serbia’s EU path further reaffirmed Poland’s reliability as a partner and its willingness to facilitate the cluster’s opening.
However, it should not be overlooked that eight member states – Sweden, Finland, the Netherlands, Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Croatia, and Bulgaria – continue to block Cluster 3’s opening. Their stance is reflected in the Council conclusions, which stress the need for more comprehensive and credible reforms in the rule of law, continued dialogue with Pristina, and stronger foreign policy alignment with EU policies. Negotiations under Poland’s leadership will not be easy.
4. Serbia’s Non-Paper and Reform Agenda
While it is encouraging to have Poland’s support, Serbia will need to work diligently to address the identified issues. Recognising the difficulty of the negotiations, Serbia submitted a non-paper in late 2024, expressing its readiness to tackle the remaining obstacles to opening Cluster 3.
The non-paper highlights commitments under the Reform Agenda, including selecting new members of the Regulatory Authority for Electronic Media (REM) Council and thoroughly revising the voter register, tasks that are said to be weeks or months from completion. The document also notes an increase in foreign policy alignment, which rose from 51% to 58% during the year, with a commitment to continue this upward trend.
Although Serbia has not imposed sanctions, it pointed out that its overall assistance to Ukraine exceeds that of all other Western Balkan states combined. Additionally, Serbia confirmed it would align its visa policy with the EU, which was immediately demonstrated by introducing visas for Mongolia, Qatar, Kuwait, and Oman.
That said, Serbia still faces significant challenges, particularly as internal deadlines for fulfilling commitments appear to be slipping. If Serbia aims to leverage Poland’s presidency and build on the Council conclusions, implementing the Reform Agenda and all obligations will be crucial to softening the positions of member states.
5. The Role of France and Germany
Since Emmanuel Macron visited Serbia in the summer of 2024, it has become clear that France intends to invest political capital to push Serbia towards EU membership. Not only were various cooperation agreements signed, including the significant contract for the purchase of "Rafale" fighter jets, but it was also publicly stated that the EU cannot complete its strategic autonomy without Serbia.
Strategic autonomy is Macron’s favoured concept, gaining particular importance after the EU became aware of its dependence on China during the pandemic and on Russia following the invasion of Ukraine. Despite the ongoing domestic political crisis, it currently appears that France will remain a reliable partner for Serbia. This is especially important given that French voters are notably sceptical about EU enlargement policy.
Unlike France’s clear stance, Germany deliberated until the last moment on how to position itself regarding the opening of Cluster 3. It is evident that Germany continues to harbour serious reservations about the state of the rule of law in Serbia. Amid the current protests, German authorities emphasised the need to guarantee the right to free and safe assembly and to protect freedom of expression. Additionally, Germany has strongly insisted on prosecuting those responsible for the incident in Banjska in 2023 and uncovering the truth about the attack on the Ibar-Lepenac canal in November 2024.
Considering these reservations, Germany has adopted a strategically ambivalent public position. While it was not necessarily prepared to exercise a veto, it also refrained from offering strong support to Serbia as France did.
What’s Next?
Serbia must continue to inform its citizens about the necessity of further progress toward EU membership as its number one strategic priority. Insisting that enlargement policy is merely a geopolitical tool cannot be the sole approach to managing citizens’ expectations. Reality consistently reminds us that, in addition to foreign policy and the normalisation of relations with Pristina, the development of the rule of law is a key prerequisite for membership.
Therefore, alongside continuous communication with citizens about the challenges and achievements on this path, the state must demonstrate determination and commitment to all areas crucial for European integration.
A clear sign of the EU’s seriousness about further enlargement by 2030 is the public discussion on drafting the Accession Treaty with Montenegro. With the Reform Agenda at the forefront, decision-makers have an opportunity to do what is necessary to advance toward membership. This would not only unlock additional funds but also demonstrate in the first quarter of 2025 that Serbia is ready and capable of adhering to self-imposed goals. This would align with the aforementioned non-paper.
It is important not to focus solely on France and Germany. A fact often overlooked in Serbia is that every EU member state has an equal vote in the Council. While France and Germany are key players in the enlargement process, both are currently grappling with serious domestic political crises, particularly as both governments have recently collapsed. Under such circumstances, these countries will be less able to significantly influence the decisions of other EU member states.